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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Petitioner : Case No. 910218 
and Cross-Respondent, Ct. of Apps. No. 890463-CA 
v. 
LOUIE EDWIN SIMS, Category No. 13 
De fendant-Re spondent 
and Cross-Petitioner. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
The following points are submitted in reply to the 
arguments in defendant's responsive brief. That brief not only 
responds to the State's opening brief, but also addresses new 
issues raised in defendant's cross-petition for certiorari. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT I 
Defendant argues that the roadblock stop of his car 
violated article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution for the 
reasons set forth in the court of appeals' decision and 
additional reasons it did not rely on below. Specifically, he 
contends that (1) a search or seizure of a vehicle cannot be 
constitutional under article I, section 14 unless it is supported 
by probable cause or other individualized suspicion of criminal 
activity, and (2) to justify a roadblock stop under article I, 
section 14, the state must show both individualized suspicion and 
statutory authority to conduct the roadblock. He asks the Court 
to reject the balancing test adopted by the United States Supreme 
Court in Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 
(1990), for determining the constitutionality of a sobriety 
checkpoint under the Fourth Amendment. 
The State concedes the roadblock here violated the 
Fourth Amendment under Sitz's analysis, and accordingly attacks 
only the court of appeals' additional holding that, because the 
roadblock was not expressly authorized by statute, it was per se 
unconstitutional under the Utah Constitution. The State is 
concerned that the court of appeals' state constitutional holding 
is not only incorrect with respect to roadblocks generally, but 
is so broad that it casts doubt on the constitutionality of a 
range of warrantless and suspicionless police conduct that is 
thought to be legal -- e.g., searches incident to arrest and 
inventory searches. 
Thus, the State asks the Court to reverse the court of 
appeals' sweeping state constitutional holding as poorly 
reasoned, and to move directly to the consent/attenuation issue 
based on the conceded Fourth Amendment violation. An analysis of 
the constitutionality of roadblocks under article I, section 14, 
holding 
beyond rejection of the court of appeals' statutory authority, is 
A 
unnecessary. 
Implicitly acknowledging the limited nature of the 
State's challenge to the court of appeals' constitutional 
analysis, defendant initially addresses the question of whether 
the court of appeals properly considered the state constitutional 
issue, it having already found the roadblock unconstitutional 
under the Fourth Amendment. Defendant concludes that, under the 
2 
"primacy" model for the analysis of state constitutions, see 
Note, The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah State Constitution, 
1986 Utah L. Rev. 319, 326 (hereafter "Utah State Constitution"). 
Utah courts should address the state constitutional question 
first and then, only if necessary, move to the federal 
constitution. He then asks this Court to construe article I, 
section 14 to require a showing of individualized suspicion 
before a search or seizure may be conducted, and on that ground, 
coupled with the grounds relied on by the court of appeals, hold 
that the roadblock in this case violated the Utah Constitution. 
A. Propriety of Addressing State Constitution First 
In its opening brief, the State did not argue that the 
court of appeals' state constitutional holding should be rejected 
as unnecessary based on the court's preceding holding that the 
roadblock violated the federal constitution. Clearly, the State 
could have. See Sims v. State Tax Comm'n. 841 P.2d 6, 15 (Utah 
1992) (Stewart, J., concurring in the result) (concluding that 
Justice Durham's plurality opinion unnecessarily reached out to 
hold the roadblock illegal under the Utah Constitution where the 
roadblock concededly violated the Fourth Amendment). But, 
uncertain of the Court's view concerning the relative merits of 
the "primacy" model versus the "interstitial" model for the 
analysis of state constitutions, the State decided to address the 
merits of the court of appeals' unique holding. See Utah State 
Constitution at 325-29 (explaining that ff[t]he primacy model 
posits state constitutions as the primary source of protection 
3 
for individual rights," and thus state constitutional claims must 
be considered first without reference to federal constitutional 
doctrine; and that fl[t]he interstitial model sees state 
constitutional law 'primarily . . . filling the spaces left open 
by federal constitutional doctrine'"). 
Defendant, however, now raises the issue of what 
approach Utah's appellate courts should adopt for state 
constitutional claims. This Court has already made clear that it 
"will not engage in a state constitutional analysis unless an 
argument for different analyses under the state and federal 
constitutions are briefed." State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 
1247 n.5 (Utah 1988), vacated on other grounds sub nom., Lafferty 
v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991). Nor will it consider a 
state constitutional issue raised for the first time on appeal. 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1216 n.ll (Utah 1993). But where, 
as here, the issue has been preserved and a different analysis 
for the state constitution is briefed, the Court has not 
developed a consistent approach. See Utah State Constitution at 
329-32 (noting and then criticizing this Court's inconsistent 
approach)1. 
1
 The author writes: 
The Utah [Supreme C]ourt's inconsistent 
reliance on the Utah Constitution deserves 
criticism. When the court, without 
explanation, alternately abstains from state 
constitutional analysis and then from federal 
constitutional analysis, it is constitution 
shopping. Such inconsistency belies 
underlying hostility toward some claims and 
favoritism for other claims. If the court is 
4 
In the related case of Sims v. State Tax Comm'n, 
Justice Durham's plurality opinion considered only whether the 
roadblock stop of defendant violated article I, section 14; there 
was no discussion of Sitz and the Fourth Amendment. Sims, 841 
P.2d at 8-9. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, however, 
rejected that approach, reasoning that the state constitutional 
analysis was mere dictum because the roadblock was clearly 
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 15. 
The clear import of Justice Stewart's opinion is that 
the Court should not reach out to interpret the content and scope 
of state constitutional protections when the particular issue is 
resolved in favor of individual rights under the federal 
constitution. At least this appears to be his position when 
Fourth Amendment and article I, section 14 rights are under 
consideration. See also Sims v. State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d at 16 
(Howe, A.C.J., dissenting, joined by flB Hall, C.J.) (finding it 
unnecessary to determine whether the roadblock was 
constitutional; that the roadblock was unconstitutional could 
simply be assumed for purposes of appeal); Zissi v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 842 P.2d 848, 859-60 (Utah 1992) (Howe, A.C.J., 
dissenting, joined by Hall, C.J.) (flI dissent from that part [of 
the majority opinion] which holds that the roadblock was illegal. 
I would not reach that issue because it is unnecessary to do 
not overtly choosing its result and then its 
constitution, it is at least careless in its 
methodology. 
Utah State Constitution at 332 (footnote omitted). 
5 
so."). 
Justice Stewart believed this approach was particularly 
appropriate where the State, as it does here, assumes the Fourth 
Amendment violation. He criticized the Sims plurality on this 
point: 
Notwithstanding the Tax Commission's 
concession that the roadblock was illegal, 
Justice Durham asserts that it would be 
"irresponsible" to assume the illegality of 
the roadblock. She does not explain, and I 
do not see, why that is so. Issues are 
frequently conceded for purposes of decision. 
It is therefore sufficient to hold that the 
federal law requires suppression of the 
illegally seized evidence. 
Sims v. State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d at 15 (Stewart, J., concurring 
in the result). Curiously, the plurality's perceived 
responsibility to analyze the constitutional issue in Sims did 
not deter that same plurality from accepting, without independent 
analysis, the parties' assumption that another roadblock was 
unconstitutional in an opinion issued just five days later, see 
Zissi, 842 P.2d at 859 (authored by Justice Zimmerman and joined 
in by Justices Durham and Stewart). 
Justice Stewart's view is consistent with the approach 
taken by a unanimous Court in State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 
(Utah 1991). There, defendant claimed that her detention as a 
passenger in a car violated the Fourth Amendment and article I, 
section 14. Id. at 762 & n.l. The Court concluded that her 
Fourth Amendment rights had been violated and declined to reach 
the state constitutional question. Id. at 762 n.l, 764. See 
also Zissi, 842 P.2d at 859 (accepting, for purposes of the 
6 
appeal and without independent analysis, the parties' assumption 
that the roadblock stop of Zissi was unconstitutional --
petitioner had argued that the roadblock violated the Fourth 
Amendment and article I, section 14 (Br. of Pet, at 13-30)). 
Justice Stewart's view is also consistent with the 
stated position of a majority of this Court in State v. Watts, 
750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988)2, that although article I, section 14 
is generally interpreted to provide no more protection than the 
Fourth Amendment, "choosing to give the Utah Constitution a 
somewhat different construction may prove to be an appropriate 
method for insulating this state's citizens from the vagaries of 
inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the 
federal courts." Id. at 1221 n.8. This language from Watts 
suggests that departure from federal analysis is justified only 
to avoid inconsistencies or ambiguities in federal Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. But see State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 
(Utah 1991) (where the Court, in a 4-1 decision, rejected the 
unambiguous United States Supreme Court holding that there is no 
protected privacy interest in bank records under the Fourth 
Amendment and held that such a privacy interest exists under 
article I, section 14). 
Accordingly, if the federal analysis clearly provides 
2
 The Chief Justice authored the majority opinion and was 
joined by Justice Howe and Judge Orme, Utah Court of Appeals 
Judge. Justice Stewart did not sit. Justice Zimmerman, joined 
by Justice Durham, dissented from any suggestion in the majority 
opinion that there is no substantive distinction between the 
Fourth Amendment and article I, section 14. 750 P.2d at 1225-26 
(Zimmerman, J., dissenting). 
7 
the defendant the requested constitutional protection, as in the 
instant case, there is no need to consider the state 
constitution. See State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 
1985) ("It is a fundamental rule that this Court should avoid 
addressing constitutional issues unless required to do so."). 
The motivation to avoid "the vagaries of inconsistent 
interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the federal 
courts" is not present. 
In sum, at least for purposes of search and seizure 
law, Johnson and Watts, coupled with Justice Stewart's concurring 
opinion in Sims v. State Tax Comm'n and Associate Chief Justice 
Howe's dissenting opinions in that case and Zissi, appear to 
resolve the "primacy" versus "interstitial" issue in favor of 
addressing the federal constitutional question first and moving 
to the state constitution only if the federal analysis does not 
provide the protection of individual rights sought by the 
litigant. Given their views in those cases, at least the Chief 
Justice, Associate Chief Justice Howe, and Justice Stewart 
apparently prefer the "interstitial" model, which "sees state 
constitutional law 'primarily . . . filling in the spaces left 
open by federal constitutional doctrine'" and "demands more 
reliance on federal law, more acknowledged borrowing." Utah 
State Constitution at 328. Indeed, in the two prominent search 
and seizure cases where the lead opinions authored by Justice 
Durham and joined in by Justice Zimmerman sought to apply the 
primacy model, State v. Larocco and Sims v. Tax Comm'n, the 
8 
remaining Justices declined to sanction that approach. 
Furthermore, Justice Stewart's view is sound. If 
certain police conduct violates the Fourth Amendment, it 
obviously also violates article I, section 14. Therefore, once a 
Fourth Amendment violation is found, it is unnecessary to go on 
to consider the state constitution in search of an additional, 
independent basis for finding the police conduct 
unconstitutional. To do so violates the judicial policy against 
advisory opinions. See Black v. Alpha Fin. Corp., 656 P.2d 409, 
410-11 (Utah 1982) (recognizing judicial policy against advisory 
opinions). 
Interestingly, aside from the instant case, the court 
of appeals has consistently stated that if the government action 
is unconstitutional on federal grounds, the state constitutional 
claim need not be considered. See, e.g., State v. Small. 829 
P.2d 129, 131 n.2 (Utah App.) (roadblock unconstitutional under 
Fourth Amendment; therefore, state constitutional claim need not 
be addressed), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992); State v. 
Park, 810 P.2d 456, 458 n.l (Utah App.) (same), cert, denied, 817 
P.2d 327 (Utah 1991); State v. Kitchen, 808 P.2d 1127, 1129 n.l 
(Utah App. 1991) (same). See also State v. Hewitt. 841 P.2d 
1222, 1224 n.l (Utah App. 1992) (because State conceded and the 
court agreed that initial traffic stop and subsequent consent to 
search were invalid on federal constitutional grounds, court did 
not need to address defendant's arguments under article I, 
section 14). 
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Based on the foregoing, the Court could vacate as 
unnecessary to the decision below the court of appeals' state 
constitutional ruling. This procedure denies precedential status 
to part of the court of appeals' opinion, without this Court 
having to address the merits of that ruling. See Rule 979, 
California Rules of Court (which provides for a similar 
"depublishing" procedure by which the California Supreme Court 
may remove precedential effect from all or part of a court of 
appeal opinion). 
B. Individualized Suspicion and Article I, Section 14 
If the Court is nevertheless inclined to reach 
defendant's state constitutional arguments, they should be 
rejected. 
First, defendant argues that for a search or seizure to 
be lawful under article I, section 14, it must be supported by 
individualized suspicion of criminal activity3. Such a broad 
rule is contrary to this Court's holding in State v. Hyah, 711 
P.2d 264, 265 (Utah 1985), that suspicionless and warrantless 
inventory searches are permitted under article I, section 14. 
Hyah makes clear that individualized suspicion is not always 
necessary for a search or seizure to be valid under the Utah 
Constitution. 
And insofar as the plurality opinion in Sims v. State 
Tax Comm'n (which supports defendant's argument) may be relied or 
3
 Defendant does not make clear whether the "individualized 
suspicion" he argues for is probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion (a level of suspicion below probable cause). 
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to decide the article I, section 14 issue in this case, its 
analysis misses the mark. That opinion concludes that the 
suspicionless investigatory roadblock stop of defendant violated 
the Utah Constitution because the requirements for a warrantless 
search were not met. Sims, 841 P.2d at 8-9. 
Noting that under article I, section 14 "warrantless 
searches of automobiles will be allowed only if probable cause 
and exigent circumstances exist," Sims, 841 P.2d at 8 (relying on 
the plurality opinion in State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 
1990)) (emphasis added), the plurality concluded that (1) "[i]n 
the case of a suspicionless investigatory roadblock . . . [t]here 
is no articulable, individualized suspicion of wrongdoing to 
establish probable cause," and (2) "because roadblocks are 
planned in advance, no exigent circumstances justify an immediate 
search," id. at 8-9. 
The basic flaw in this analysis is that a roadblock 
stop is a seizure, not a search. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450 
("Petitioners concede, correctly in our view, that a Fourth 
Amendment 'seizure' occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a 
checkpoint."); Sims, 841 P.2d at 9 n.7 ("'Roadblocks are seizures 
of the person[.]'" (quoting Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 
743 P.2d 692, 695 (1987))). While a search may follow the 
roadblock stop, Nelson v. Lane County, 743 P.2d at 695 (quoted in 
Sims, 841 P.2d at 9 n.7), the stop is nevertheless a seizure, the 
validity of which is analyzed independently of the validity of 
the search. Thus, the plurality erroneously applied the state 
11 
constitutional principles for automobile searches enunciated by 
the same plurality in Larocco. 
The plurality's confusion on this point is reflected in 
its initial, erroneous application of search analysis in 
determining the constitutionality of the roadblock, Sims, 841 
P.2d at 8-9, and then its subsequent, proper characterization of 
the roadblock as a seizure: "In conjunction with the question of 
the legality of the roadblock in this case, we must address the 
question of whether Sims' subsequent consent to a search of his 
car alleviates the taint of the prior illegal seizure.11 Id. at 9 
(emphasis added)). Furthermore, the plurality's requirement that 
there be probable cause --as opposed to reasonable suspicion --
for this investigatory stop rejects, without explanation, the 
well settled reasonable suspicion standard for investigatory 
stops under the Fourth Amendment. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968); Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648 (1979); State v. Gibson. 
665 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Utah), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983). 
Finally, under the plurality's view that the absence of 
probable cause and exigent circumstances renders suspicionless 
investigatory roadblocks unconstitutional under the Utah 
Constitution, "all preplanned, suspicionless roadblocks [are] 
illegal, including roadblocks intended to remove intoxicated 
drivers from the highways or to enforce automobile safety 
measures." Sims, 841 P.2d at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring in the 
result). Although they seem to exempt from their sweeping 
constitutional rule emergency roadblocks used to apprehend a 
12 
fleeing felon and statutorily authorized ports of entry and fish 
and game roadblocks, Sims, 841 P.2d at 8 n.3, the plurality fails 
to explain how those suspicionless investigatory stops could 
escape unscathed. Those seizures, like the roadblock here, fail 
to meet either one or both of the plurality's requirements of 
probable cause and exigent circumstances. 
To conclude, defendant's contention, that a search or 
seizure must be supported by individualized suspicion of criminal 
activity in order to be valid under article I, section 14, is 
contrary to State v. Hycrh. Furthermore, although the Sims 
plurality opinion provides support for defendant's argument, that 
opinion is seriously flawed and should not be followed. 
C. Express Statutory Authority 
Defendant argues that the warrant and reasonableness 
requirements of article I, section 14 justify the court of 
appeals' holding that the roadblock was per se unconstitutional 
because it was not expressly authorized by statute. To make his 
argument he relies on the conclusion of the plurality in Sims v. 
State Tax Comm'n that there was no statutory authority -- express 
or implied -- for the roadblock at which defendant was stopped. 
Recognizing that the State concedes there was no 
express statutory authority for the roadblock, defendant takes 
issue with the State's contention that roadblocks are impliedly 
authorized by statute and that other accepted police practices --
specifically, searches incident to arrest and inventory searches 
-- are not expressly authorized by statute. 
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To be clear, the State argues that roadblocks are 
impliedly authorized by statutes pertaining to the general 
authority of law enforcement officers. See State's Opening Br. 
at 7. This is so whether the roadblock is used to control 
traffic, enforce automobile safety measures, apprehend a fleeing 
felon, or remove intoxicated drivers from the road. Granted 
there may be certain constitutional restrictions on the various 
types of roadblocks, but that does not undercut the conclusion 
that they are impliedly within an officer's general statutory 
authority to enforce the law. 
The legislature has granted peace officers broad 
authority to enforce the laws of this state. For example, the 
Utah Highway Patrol is statutorily authorized to "enforce the 
state laws and rules governing use of the state highways" and to 
"regulate traffic on all highways and roads of the state." Utah 
Code Ann. § 27-10-4(a) & (b) (1989) (renumbered effective July 1, 
1993, Utah Code Ann. § 53-8-105(1) & (2) (Supp. 1993)). Under 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-914(1) (Supp. 1992), municipal police 
officers have the "authority to preserve the public peace, 
prevent crime, detect and arrest offenders, suppress riots, 
protect persons and property, remove nuisances existing in the 
public streets, roads, and highways, enforce every law relating 
to the suppression of offenses, and perform all duties required 
of them by ordinance or resolution." Similar statutes relate to 
the duties of the sheriff and sheriff's deputies, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 17-22-2 (1991), and the duties of peace officers generally to 
14 
enforce the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act, Utah Code Ann. § 
41-1-17 (1988) . 
These statutes are most reasonably read as giving the 
police broad authority to engage in any law enforcement practice 
that is constitutional, unless a specific statutory restriction 
exists. See People v. Estrada. 68 Ill.App.3d 272, 386 N.E.2d 
128, 133-34, cert, denied. 444 U.S. 968 (1979). 
Defendant ignores these statutes, contending the only 
statutes that potentially authorize roadblocks -- Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-1-17 (1988)4 and Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990)5 -- both 
require that an officer have at least a reasonable suspicion to 
stop. See also Sims v. State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d at 9 n.7 
4
 Section 41-1-17 provides in pertinent part: 
[P]eace officers [and] state patrolman . . 
. shall have power and it shall be their 
duty: 
. . . 
(c) When on duty, upon reasonable belief 
that any vehicle is being operated in 
violation of any provision of this act or of 
any law regulating the operation of vehicles 
to require the driver thereof to stop, 
exhibit his driver's license and the 
registration card issued for the vehicles 
[sic] and submit to an inspection of such 
vehicle, the registration plates and 
registration card thereon. 
5
 Section 77-7-15 provides: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is 
in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 
15 
("[I]n the existing statutes, the Utah Legislature has provided 
that suspicion of wrongdoing is a condition precedent for 
authority to stop a person or vehicle. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-
3-105(8) (b), 77-7-15. This serves as additional support for our 
rejection of implicit statutory authority for investigatory 
roadblocks.")11. He apparently believes, as did the Sims 
plurality, that the referenced statutes are limitations on an 
officer's authority to make a stop of a vehicle or its occupants. 
He misconstrues the statutes. 
Section 77-7-15 is merely a codification of the 
constitutional standard for an investigatory stop enunciated in 
Terry v. Ohio. State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 
1990); State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 507 (Utah App. 1989). 
Similarly, section 41-1-17 is nothing more than a codification of 
the constitutional standard for an investigatory stop of a 
vehicle set forth in Delaware v. Prouse (under the Fourth 
Amendment, to lawfully stop a vehicle for investigatory purposes, 
an officer must have at least a reasonable suspicion that either 
the vehicle or an occupant has violated or is about to violate 
the law -- i.e., a traffic or equipment regulation, or an 
applicable criminal law). 
Contrary to the construction defendant and the Sims 
plurality would give these provisions, they do not prescribe the 
only circumstances in which an officer may stop a vehicle or its 
4
^Tho State ij unable to^ loefrfca ceotion-41 3 105(0) (b)r 
oited by tho Cimo plurality.' \2>^lf) 
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occupants. Had that been the legislature's intent, it would have 
used appropriate limiting language, such as: "An officer may 
stop a vehicle only if there is at least a reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity." Instead, sections 77-7-15 and 41-1-17 
merely codify established federal constitutional standards 
without prohibiting other police conduct that, although outside 
the scope of these statutes, is nevertheless constitutional and 
impliedly authorized by statute. 
Finally, defendant disputes the State's contention that 
searches incident to arrest and inventory searches, presumably 
constitutional police practices, are not expressly authorized by 
statute and do not require individualized suspicion. He claims 
the opposite is true. 
While the power to arrest is authorized by statute and 
probable cause is required to justify an arrest, that says 
nothing about the prerequisites for a search incident to arrest. 
The arrest, which is a seizure of the person, is distinct from 
the search. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 26. And, in United 
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973), the Supreme Court 
specifically rejected the argument that there must be 
individualized suspicion beyond the probable cause for an arrest 
to justify a warrantless search incident thereto: "A custodial 
arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable 
intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being 
lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional 
justification" (emphasis added). 
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Thus# the Supreme Court has made clear that 
individualized suspicion is not required to justify a search 
incident to arrest. Nor does the authority to search arise from 
the statutes authorizing arrest; a search incident to arrest, 
which is distinct from the arrest itself, is independently 
authorized by Supreme Court case law. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 
77-7-9 (1990) ("Any person making an arrest may seize from the 
person arrested all weapons which he may have on or about his 
person."). 
Similarly, the "reasonable and proper justification" 
language from State v. Hyah, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), upon which 
defendant relies for his argument that inventory searches require 
individualized suspicion and are expressly authorized by statute, 
refers to impoundment of a vehicle, the seizure that necessarily 
precedes an inventory search. The entire sentence from Hyah 
reads: "In order to support a finding that a valid inventory 
search has taken place, the court must first determine whether 
there was reasonable and proper justification for the impoundment 
of the vehicle." 711 P.2d at 268. The justification for the 
initial seizure (the impoundment) "can be had either through 
explicit statutory authorization or by the circumstances of the 
stop." Ibid. Again, defendant fails to recognize the 
distinction between the search and the seizure in this context. 
The inventory search itself is not authorized by statute, nor 
must it be supported by individualized suspicion. See South 
Dakota v. Qpperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). 
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In sum, roadblocks are implicitly authorized by 
statute, and the absence of express statutory authority does not 
render them per se unconstitutional under the Utah Constitution, 
D. The Sitz Balancing Test 
In Sitz, the Supreme Court adopted a balancing test for 
determining the constitutionality of a sobriety checkpoint 
operated by the police. Defendant urges the Court to reject that 
test in determining whether the roadblock in this case violated 
article I, section 14. 
As previously argued, this Court need not consider the 
state constitutional issue beyond either a determination that the 
court of appeals erroneously reached out to decide the article I, 
section 14 question, or a determination that the court of 
appeals' express statutory authority holding is incorrect. 
Defendant's invitation to reject the Sitz analysis should, 
therefore, be left for future consideration. This is 
particularly true in light of the enactment, after the court of 
appeals' decision in this case, of statutes authorizing the type 
of roadblock employed here (Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-23-101 through -
105 (Supp. 1993)). See Sims v. State Tax Comm'n. 841 P.2d at 9 
("Whether constitutionally sufficient standards and guidelines 
could be incorporated in statutory form is a question we leave 
for future consideration.11). 
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REPLY TO DEFENDANT" S POINT II 
Responding to the State's argument that the court of 
appeals incorrectly applied the exploitation prong of the Arroyo 
test7, defendant focuses on the flagrancy factor and contends 
that the roadblock here constituted a flagrant constitutional 
violation. Therefore, he argues, defendant's consent to a search 
of his car could not be valid in the absence of intervening 
circumstances or a significant lapse of time. 
In State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1263 (Utah 1993), 
the Court made clear that H "Arroyo's primary goal was to deter 
the police from engaging in illegal conduct even though that 
conduct may be followed by a voluntary consent to the subsequent 
search." "[T]he analysis used to invalidate consent on the basis 
of exploitation [is] grounded firmly in the deterrent purposes of 
the exclusionary rule." Ibid. ""The 'purpose and flagrancy' 
factor directly relates to the deterrent value of suppression[,] 
. . . [and] '[t]he deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule 
necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or 
at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the 
defendant of some right.'" Ibid, (quoting Brown v. Illinois. 422 
U.S. 590, 612 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring), in turn quoting 
Michigan v. Tucker. 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974)). 
Contrary to defendant's contention, the use of the 
roadblock here did not even constitute negligent police conduct, 
and thus the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule would not 
7
 State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). 
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be fulfilled by suppressing the drugs found in the consent search 
of defendant's car. In United States v. Prichard. 645 F.2d 854 
(10th Cir.), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1981), the Tenth Circuit 
upheld against a Fourth Amendment challenge a roadblock conducted 
by New Mexico state police officers with the knowledge and 
permission of their supervisors. As the court noted, "The stated 
purpose of the roadblock was to conduct a routine driver's 
license and car registration check. The officers candidly 
conceded, however, that if they observed indicia of other crimes 
during their check of drivers' licenses and vehicle 
registrations, they intended to enforce the law." 645 F.2d at 
855. 
In holding that the roadblock was constitutional under 
Delaware v. Prouse, the court said: "The purpose of the 
roadblock, i.e., to check drivers' licenses and car 
registrations, was a legitimate one. If, in the process of so 
doing, the officers saw evidence of other crimes, they had the 
right to take reasonable investigative steps and were not 
required to close their eyes." Id. at 857. 
The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed the Prichard holding in 
numerous subsequent cases. United States v. Obreaon, 748 F.2d 
1371, 1376 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Lopez. 777 F.2d 
543, 547 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Corral. 823 F.2d 
1389, 1392 (10th Cir. 1987), cert, denied. 486 U.S. 1054 (1988). 
Indeed, in Lopez, the court rejected an argument similar to the 
one made by defendant: that, because the officers at the 
21 
driver's license/vehicle registration roadblock were also looking 
for evidence of illegal activity, the roadblock was an 
unconstitutional multi-purpose roadblock. 777 F.2d at 547. 
Based on the Tenth Circuit decisions upholding the New 
Mexico roadblocks, it cannot be said that the officers in the 
instant case flagrantly violated the Fourth Amendment or article 
I, section 14 when they conducted their pre-Sitz, pre-Sims 
roadblock. In fact, the Tenth Circuit decisions gave them every 
reason to believe the roadblock was constitutional. Thus, 
although the roadblock was later ruled unconstitutional by the 
court of appeals, the officers did not even negligently, let 
alone flagrantly, violate the federal or state constitutions. In 
short, it cannot be said they should have known (the standard for 
negligence) that the roadblock was unconstitutional. 
Accordingly, the roadblock at which defendant was 
stopped constituted neither a flagrant nor a negligent 
constitutional violation. Further, based on the exploitation 
analysis set forth in the State's opening brief, which assumes a 
non-flagrant violation for purposes of applying the Arroyo test, 
suppression of the drugs found in defendant's car pursuant to his 
voluntary consent to search is not warranted. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments and the arguments 
contained in the State's opening brief, this Court should reverse 
22 
the court of appeals and affirm defendant's conviction. 
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